AN: D840117-0151

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ACTION H-03 MANAGU 01 OF 00958 04 2215437

0CT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INFO 55-00 ----267607 2302272 /72

NSCE-00

IS/FPC/CDR/

EO Citations

Date: 7.5-76

R 2212357 FEB 84 FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA TO SECSTATE WASHOC 9793 INFO CONTADORA COLLECTIVE() USLETE Non-Responsive Info USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 920204 RELEASE DECLASSIFY MR Cases Only: () DECLASSIFY () EXCISE () DENY IN PART

TS authorit

FOIA exemptions PA Exemptions () CLASSIFY as () S or I DOWNGRADE IS to 1 - 6 or

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION OF 04 MANAGUA 0958

EO 12356: DECL: 2/17/90 TAGS: OREP (ASPIN. LES) NU

SUBJECT: CODEL ASPIN: MEETING WITH SERGIO RAMIREZ MERCADO OF

GRN JUNTA

· 1. -CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN CODEL ASPIN'S MEETING WITH JUNTA MEMBER SERGIO RAMIREZ FEBRUARY 13. ASPIN RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT GRN INTEN-TIONS AND EXPRESSED U.S. CONCERNS REGARDING: GRN RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.; THE GRN'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY; THE GRN'S PLAN FOR ELECTIONS; THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS THROUGH CONTADORA; NICARAGUA'S CUBAN/SOVIET ALIGNMENT; AND NICARAGUAN SUPPORT FOR THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS. RAMIREZ EXPRESSED THE GRN'S VIEW ON CONTADORA AND OTHER PROPOSALS. HE DESCRIBED THE UPCOMING NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS AS "TRADITIONALLY LATIN AMERICAN." IF THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE DID NOT ELECT THE SANDINISTAS. THE FSLN WOULD ACCEPT ITS DECISION. HE SAID NICARAGUAN DEMOCRACY. WHEN FACED WITH A THREAT OF WAR. COULD NOT BE PROPERLY COMPARED WITH AMERICA'S WELL-DEVELOPED SYSTEM.

3. RAMIREZ CITED NICARAGUA'S U.N. VOTING RECORD AS INDICATIVE OF ITS NON-ALIGNMENT. AND ADMITTED 4.000 CUBAN ADVISERS WERE IN NICARAGUA, OF WHOM NO MORE THAN 200 WERE MILITARY. THE GRN WOULD DISCUSS THE REMOVAL OF ADVISERS AND NICARAGUAN CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENT TAL

PAGE 02

MANAGU 00958 01 OF 04 2215437

ASSISTANCE TO THE SALVADORAN INSURGENTS ONLY AS A PART OF A



REGIONAL AGREEMENT. CONTADORA PROSPECTS FOR PEACE DEPENDED ON THE U.S. HE HOPEC NECERAGUAN - U.S. RELATIONS WOULD IMPROVE, BUT INSISTED THAT FIRST THE U.S. HAD TO LEARN NOT TO B AFRAID OF CHANGE. END SUMMARY.

4. CODEL ASPIN MET WITH JUNTA MEMBER SERIO RAMIREZ MERCADO ON FEBRUARY 13. PROVIDING ASPIN THE OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM THE SANDINISTA LEADERSHIP. THE AMBASSADOR AND ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER VICTOR TINOCO WERE ALSO IN ATTENDANCE. AFTER INTRODUCTORY PLEASANTIRES ASPIN SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER VISITED CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE. HE HAD MANY QUESTIONS. AND WANTED TO EXPRESS HIS VIEWS ON SOME ISSUES TO THE GRN. HE ASKED WHAT RELATIONSHIP THE GRN WANTED TO HAVE WITH THE U.S. RAMIREZ SAID THE GRN WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES THROUGH CONTADORA AND THROUGH ITS OWN PROPOSALS TO THE USG. THE GRN HAD ALSO ATTEMPTED TO ADDRESS U.S. SECURITY CONCERNS. THE GRN DID NOT WANT ISOLATION FROM THE U.S. IN THE FUTURE. ON THE OTHER HAND. NICARAGUA WANTED TO MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENCE. RAMIREZ SAID THAT NICARAGUA COULD NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT THE U.S. WAS SO CLOSE AND SO POWERFUL. AT THE SAME TIME THE U.S. MUST REALIZE THAT NEITHER COULD IT CHANGE NICARAGUA'S SITUATION; NOT THROUGH THE CIA, THROUGH SUBVERSION OR THROUGH . FUNDS TO THE CONTRA.

5. ACCORDING TO RAMIREZ, THE ELECTORAL PROCESS WOULD COME ABOUT SONNER THAN ANTICIPATED. HE DID NOT ELABORATE. IF PEOPLE CHOSE SOMEONE OTHER THAT THE SANDINISTAS, HE SAID, THE FSLN WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT ITS DECISION. BUT THAT WAS NOT THE SAME AS BEING FORCED TO CHANGE BY USE OF MILITARY FORCE. NOBODY THOUGHT THE NATIONAL GUARD (GN), WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN ARMS BY THE CIA, WAS A VIABLE POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE. BESIDES, CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MANAGU 00958 01 0F 04 221543Z

THE CIA'S MONEY WAS NOT JUST BEING USED TO BUY ARMS.
"MANY NEW FORTUNES" WERE BEING BORN AS WELL. TWENTY-EIGHT
TO FORTY-EIGHT MILLION DOLLARS WAS A LOT OF MONEY. ASPIN
REMARKED THAT IF THAT WAS WHAT THE MONEY WAS BEING USED FOR
THE GRN DIDN'T HAVE TO WORRY. RAMIREZ RETORTED THAT WITH
THAT MONEY, THE U.S. HAD KILLED 1,000 NICARAGUANS IN THE POST
YEAR. ECONOMIC LOSSES WERE AS MUCH AS \$250 MILLION, A GREAT
DEAL OF MONEY FOR NICARAGUA. EQUAL TO ABOUT ONE HALF OF ITS
EXPORTS.

6. ASPIN THEN ASKED RAMIREZ IF HE CONSIDERED THE CONTRAS AS ALL

CONFIDENTIAL UNLASSIFE

FORMER SOMOCISTA NATIONAL GUARDSMEN(GN). RAMIREZ ANSWERED, "PRINCIPALLY, YES." HE SALD THAT "OPERATIONAL DECISIONS WERE TAKEN BY THE FON AND GIAL OFFICERS." THE HEADS."

OF THE TASK FORCES WERE EX-GN AND USED TO BE JUNIOR OFFICERS UNDER SOMOZA. WHEN ASKED ABOUT OPPOSITION IN THE SOUTH, RAMIREZ SAID THE FORCES THERE WERE NOT AS INTEGRATED AS THE FON. WHICH WAS MORE UNIFIED BECAUSE THE CIA HAD GIVEN IT.

DISCIPLINE. IN THE SOUTH THERE WERE NOW 4-5 GROUPS RATHER THAN THE ORIGINAL UNIFIED FORCE. AND THEY WERE SHORT OF MONEY. PASTORA WAS A DIFFICULT PERSON AND THE CIA COULD NOT WORK WITH HIM.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEOMPHOENTIME IN ASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MANAGU. COSS D2 OF 22 2556Z ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SS-00 NSCE-00 ARA-10 /014

R 2212357 FEB 84
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9794
INFO CONTADORA COLLECTIVE
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 04 MANAGUA 0958

7. ASPIN SAID THAT PEOPLE LIKE PASTORA RAISED QUESTIONS IN THE U.S. ABOUT THOSE WHO WERE ORIGINALLY SUPPORTERS OF THE REVOLUTION BUT WHO LATER MOVED TO THE OPPOSITION. THIS CAUSED POEPLE TO WONDER ABOUT THE REASONS FOR THEIR CHANGE OF HEART. IN GENERAL, ASPIN CONTINUED, U.S. PUBLIC OPINION ON NICARAGUA WAS IN A STATE OF FLUX. MANY PEOPLE DID NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT IT TO MAKE INFORMED DECISIONS. ASPIN SAID THERE WAS A GROUP OF DEMOCRATS IN CONGRESS WHICH WAS VEY SUPPORTIVE OF THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION, BUT THAT GROUP CARRIED LITTLE INFLUENCE. U.S. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ACTION IN GRENADA WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THAT.

8. THE GRN WAS NOT AFRAID OF AN ARMED OPPOSITION, ACCORDING TO RAMIREZ. THERE WAS NO GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD WITHOUT SOME TYPE OF OPPOSITION. YES, THE GRN HAD DAMAGED THE INTERESTS OF SOME. THE REVOLUTION HAD NEVERTHELESS CHANGED THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH FROM THE FEW HAVING ALL, TO THE MANY HAVING SOME. SOME HAD MOVED TO THE OPPOSITION CAMP IN DISAGREEMENT WITH THE SANDINISTAS, BUT THAT DID NOT GIVE THEM THE RIGHT TO SEEK FUNDS TO MOUNT AN ARMED OPPOSITION. IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT THE GRN WOULD MAKE MANY ERRORS. SOME PEOPLE IN NICARAGUA THOUGHT THAT THINGS SHOULD BE LIKE THEY USED TO BE UNDER SOMOIA. THEY HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE UNDER SOMOIA AND BENEFITED JUST AS HE HAD. THEY WERE NEVERTHELESS NOT NOW TYING TO OVERTHROW THE GRN AND

-CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MANAGU 0'0958 02 0F 04 221556Z

LEARN TO UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OPPSOITION AND THE COUNTERREVOLUTION.

I ROLASSIFIED

UNGLASSIFIED

9. ASPIN SAID THERE WAS NO SUPPORT IN THE U.S. FOR A RETURN OF SOMOZA .: WHAP THERE . WAS SUPPURT FOR WAS THE IDEA OF COMPETITION FOR VOTES PERHAPS RAMIREZ HAD A DIFFERENT IDEA OF DEMOCRACY THAN DID THE U.S. RAMIREZ SAID HE KNEW ABOUT DEMOCRACY IN THE U.S.. AND HE KNEW ITS MECHANI FOR EXAMPLE. HE KNEW HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS FOR A THIRD PARTY TO MAKE ANY HEADWAY IN THE SYSTEM. SOME SPOKE OF A NATURAL SELECTION OF POLITICAL FORCES. THE IDEA OF SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST. IN NICARAGUA NOW THERE WERE ABOUT FIFTEEN DIFFERENT PARTIES (SIC). THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE A PROCESS OF NATURAL SELECTION TO SEE WHO WOULD SURVIVE. NICARAGUA WAS GOING TO ELECT A CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY AND EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES WITH CONSITITUTIONAL POWERS, AS ALL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAD DONE. THE GRN WOULD SELECT A SUPREME ELECTORAL COUNCIL INDEPENDENT FROM THE GOVERNMENT TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, NICARAGUA WOULD HE PLURALIST SOCIETY CHARACTERISTIC OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIB


10. RAMIREZ REITEREATED THAT NICARÁGUA WAS NOT TRYING TO BREAK WITH LATIN AMERICAN TRADITIONS. IT WAS PART OF THE LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND WOULD REMAIN SO. ASPIN QUESTIONED THE GRN'S REAL INTENT, BEYOND THE FORMAL STEP OF HOLDING ELECTIONS, TO CREATE A TRULY PLURALISTIC SOCIETY WITH FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ETC. THE U.S. FAVORED COMPETITION OF INTERESTS WITCH WERE EXPRESSED THROUGH ORGANIZED POLITICAL FORCES.

11. RAMIREZ SAID IT WAS THE GRN'S DESIRE TO HAVE A FUNCTIONIN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM IN THE NICARAGUAN CONTEXT. HOWEVER, IT WAS THING TO HAVE A FUNCTIONAL DEMOCRACY UNDER A PERMANENT MILITATION FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03

MANAGU. 00958 02 0F 04 221556Z

THREAT, AND ANOTHER IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH GAVE IT A REAL CHAIF HE, RAMIREZ, COULD CONSTRUCT THE IDEAL SCENARIO, THEN THE AND GRN WOULD SIGN AN AGREEMENT TO RID THE AREA OF ALL MILITARY ADVISERS AND MILITARY AID. AFTER THAT, IF THE GRN DID NOT HOLD FREE ELECTIONS, DID NOT PUT AN ASSEMBLY IN PLACE, AND STILL CENSORED THE PRESS, THEN THAT WOULD BE ANOTHER STORY. IT WAS NOT FAIR TO COMPARE THE U.S. SYSTEM, WHICH FUNCTIONED IN PEACE, WITH THAT IN NICARAGUA WHICH WAS FIGHTING A WAR. RAMIREZ ASKED HOW THE U.S. WOULD BE AFFECTED IF IT HAD 100,000 ARMED MEN ATTACKING FROM MEXICO EVERY DAY. PUTTING THINGS IN PERSPECTIVE, INSTEAD OF \$250 MILLION




CONFIDENTIAL

UECLASSIFIED

DAMAGE. HOW WOULD \$2.5 BILLION AFFECT THE U.S.?

12. ASPIN ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE CONTRAS WERE NOT SUPPORTED, AND OLD NOT EXIST. WOULD THERE BE COMPLETE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS WITH NO CENSORHIP? RAMIREZ ANSWERED THAT THERE WOULD. "NOT ONLY THAT, BUT EVEN WITH THE SOMOZA GUARD(I.E., THE CONTRAS) WE WILL FULFILL THE MINIMUM RULES FOR FREE ELECTIONS." ASPIN POINTED OUT THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO HAPPEN SOON ENOUGH FOR THE OPPOSITION PARTIES TO HAVE A CHANCE. HE SAID THERE WERE REASONS TO PUT LIMITS ON DEMOCRACY, CITING THE U.S. CIVIL WAR. THE U.S. CONCERN WAS THAT THOSE REASONS NOT BECOME AN EXCUSE TO CONTINUE OPPRESSION. HE WONDERED WHEN SOUTH KOREA WOULD OPEN UP ITS DEMOCRACY, FOR THE GOVERNMENT ALWAYS POINTED TO THE THREAT FROM THE NORTH. IT SEEMED THAT SUCH THINGS WERE OFTEN SPOKEN ABOUT IN PRINCIPLE, BUT SEEMINGLY WERE ALWAYS POSTPONED.

CONFIDENTIAL



-CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL-

USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

PAGE 01 MANAGU 009 B 03 GF 04 221615Z ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 S5-00 NSCE-00 ARA-10
------270121 230232Z /72
R 221235Z FEB 84
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9795
INFO CONTADORA COLLECTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 04 MANAGUA 0958

13. ASPIN MOVED TO OTHER AREAS. WHAT FOREIGN POLICY GOALS DID NICRAGUA HAVE? RAMIREZ SAID IT HAD VERY CLEAR GOALS AND IT WAS NON-ALIGNED AND TRIED TO FUNCTION AS SUCH. EVEN THOUGHAT CLASHED WITH TRADITION. NICARAGUA HAD PASSED FROM NEVER HAVING VOTING AGAINST THE U.S. UNDER SOMOZA TO VOTING AGAINST U.S. MANY TIMES, BUT NOT ALWAYS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN DECIDING ITS VOTE, THE GRN FIRST EXAMINED ITS OWN INTERESTS. AFTER ONE YEAR ON THE U.SN. SECURITY COUNCIL, THE GRN HAD A RECORD OF INDEPENDENT VOTING. IT HAD EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS AND HAD CREATED BALANCE IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY.

14. ASPTN ASKED BOUT THE SOVIET UNION/CUBA CONNECTON. RAMIREZ SAID THOSE RELATIONS COULD NOT CHANGE. THE GRN HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, RESPECTFUL ONES. ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA WAS MUCH CLOSER. HE EXPALINED THAT WHILE CUBA WAS A SOCIALIST COUNTRY, IT WAS ALSO A LATIN AMERICOUNTRY WITH STRONG TIES TO NICARAGUA. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES REFLECTED THOSE TIES, BUT THAT WAS NOT TO SAY THAT CUBA DICTATED NICARAGUAN POLICY.

15. TO ASPIN'S QUESTION ON THE NUMBER OF CUBAN ADVISERS IN NICARAGUA, RAMIREZ REPLIED THAT THERE WERE ABOUT 4,000 TOTAL.. THESE INCLUDED 2,000 PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS. 800 DOCTORS AND TECHNICIANS IN RAILROAD, HIGHWAY AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MANAGU 00958 03 0F 04 2216157

AND NO MORE THAN 200 MILITARY ADVISERS. ASPIN TURNED TO THE TRAINING OF NICARAGUAN PERSONNEL ABROAD. TO YOU

GONFIDENTINE BUILASSIFIED

-CONFIDENTIAL

UNGLASSIFIED

RAMIREZ CLAIMED CLIBA MADE MORE OFFERS, AND TRAINING COULD BE GOTTEN INDIVERSE FIELDS THERE: HERE NEVERTHELESS MANY STUDENTS STUDYING IN MEXICO AS WELL AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. THE GRN WOULD ACCEPT ASSISTANCE FROM ANY COUNTRY. IT ALSO HAD ADVISERS FROM THE U.S., WEST GERMANY, HOLLAND AND SPAIN. THERE WERE PERHAPS SOME 2,000 FROM WESTERN EUROPE. ASPIN INTER JECTED THAT QUESTIONS LIKE THE NUMBER OF CUBAN/SOVIET ADVISERS WERE CAUSE FOR CONCERN IN THE UNITED STATES. RAMIREZ SAID THAT PEOPLE WERE NOT WELL INFORMED. NICARAGUA PRODUCED EXCELLENT TOBACCO, AND VERY GOOD CIGARS WERE MADE FROM IT BY CUBANS LIVITHERE WHO WERE NOT FIDELISTS.

16. ARCHIE BARRETT. WHO ACCOMPANIED ASPIN. SAID THAT RAMIREZ HAD NOT MENTIONED ANOTHER PROBLEM. JTHAT OF NICARAGUA'S SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR. RAMIREZ SAID THE GRN HAD PLACED ALL ITS CARDS ON THE TABLE ON THIS SUBJECT IN OCTOBER. THE GRN WAS WILLING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THE MATTER AND ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN ADVISORS. BUT ONLY AS A PART OF A GLOBAL SOLUTION. AND AS LONG AS OTHER HILITARY ADVISERS LEFT THE REGION. THE AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO INCLUDE SUSPENSION OF ALL ARMAMENTS FLOWING INTO CENTRAL AMERICA. BARRETT TOLD RAMIREZ THAT HE THOU THOSE CONDITIONS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. THEREFORE. THE GRN SEEMED TO HAVE PLACED PROPOSITIONS ON THE TABLE WHICH W NON-NEGOTIABLE. THE U.S. WAS HELPING THE GOES BECAUSE IT WANTED ASSISTANCE. RAMIREZ RETORTED THAT THE GRN COULD LIKEWISE SAY TH WANTED CUBAN ASSISTANCE. BARRETT ASKED RAMIREZ IF HIS CON-CLUSION WAS THAT IF THE U.S. COULD NOT ACCEPT THE GRN'S PROPOSALS. THEN THE GRN WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE SALVADORAL GUERRILLAS? RAMIREZ REPLIED ONLY THAT THE GRN WAS WILLING TO -CONFIDENTIAL -CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03

MANAGU 00958 03 OF 04 221615Z

DISCUSS THE MATTER AS PART OF A REGIONAL AGREEMENT. HE ADDED THAT THE LARGEST FLOW OF ARMS TO THE GUERRILLAS WAS FROM THE GOES. THE U.S. COULD NOT ASK THE GRN TO MAKE UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS AND THEN ATTEMPT TO PUNISH NICARAGUA FOR NOT DOING SO.

17. ASPIN ASKED ABOUT CONTADORA'S CHANCES FOR SUCCESS.
RAMIREZ SAID IT DEPENDED UPON THE U.S. THE MEMBER NATIONS
HAD GOOD WILL, AND COMMISSIONS WERE WORKING ON CONCRETE
ISSUES. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN, HE ASKED, ONCE HONDURAS SIGNED
AN AGREEMENT WHICH REQUIRED IT TO TAKE ALL THE GN OUT OF A



DEMILITARIZED ZONE? THEN THE USG WOULD HAVE TO TAKE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORTING THE CONTRAS. THE GRN WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH ALL TOF THE LON TANDOR ALPROPOSALS AND PARTICI-PATED IN ALL THE COMMITTEES: ASPIN SAID THE CONTADORA PROPO-SALS WOULD BE HARD TO VERIFY. RAMIREZ AGREED, THE GRN ALSO HAD ADDRESSED THAT PROBLEM IN ITS PROPOSALS.

18. ASPIN SAID HE WANTED TO KNOW FOR HIMSELF IF THE DIFFER-ENCES BETWEEN THE US AND THE GRN WERE REAL OR SEMANTIC: WERE THE DIFFERENCES FUNDAMENTAL. PRECLUDING AGREEMENT, OR WERE THEY JUST PROCEDURAL? RAMIREZ ESPLAINED THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME NICARAGUA WAS WORKING INDEPENDENTLY OF THE U.S.. WHICH HAD NOT WANTED A CHANGE FROM SOMOZA. SOMOZA'S TIME HAD PASSED. IT WOULD TAKE TIME FOR NICARGUA TO FORGET THE SUPPORT THE U.S. HAD GIVEN HIM. IN THE MEANTIME. THE GRN WAS GOING TO KEEP A WARY EYE ON THE U.S. THE GRN WOULD NOT ACCEPT U.S. ARROGANCE IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH NICARAGUA.

CONFLOENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 ACTION H-03 MANAGU 0.0958 . 04 0 0 04 2216237

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SS-00 NSCE-00 ARA-10 /014

R 2212357 FEB 84
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9796
INFO CONTADORA COLLECTIVE
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 04 MANAGUA 0958

19. ASPIN SAID THAT AN OUTSIDE OBSERVER, JUDGING FROM THE RHETORIC ALONE, WOULD BELIEVE IT WAS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE U.S. AND NICARAGUA TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS. WAS THERE SOMETHING BEYOND THE RHETORIC WHICH RAMIREZ BELIEVED COULD MAKE POSSIBLE A DECENT RELATIONSHIP? RAMIREZ REPLIED THAT THERE WAS, BECAUSE THERE WERE NO FEELINGS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE, ONLY ANTI-INTERVENTIONISM. NICARAGUA CARRIED WITH IT MUCH FROM U.S. CULTURE, AND THOSE TIES COULD NOT BE BROKEN. HE SAID THE SANDINISTAS WERE NOT RADICAL FANATICS. THE GRN WANTED CONDITIONS IN WHICH U.S. CULTURE AND INDUSTRY COULD HELP NICARAGUAN DEVELOPMENT.

20. ASPIN ASKED RAMIREZ HOW THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION DIFFERED FROM CUBA'S, WHOSE HISTORY WAS SIMILAR AND WHERE STRONG ANTI-U.S. RHETORIC WAS ALSO THE BYWORD. RAMIREZ SAID THE BAY OF PIGS HAD CAUSED A PROFOUND CHANGE IN U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS. IN NICARAGUA, HOWEVER, AMERICANS COULD WALK THE STREETS IN PEACE. THERE WERE REGULAR FLIGHTS TO THE U.S. AND MUCH TRAVEL BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. ASPIN ASKED IF RAMIREZ WAS SAYING THAT BARRING A BAY OF PIGS, THE U.S.-NICARAGUAN RELATIONSHIP WOULD DEVELOP LIKE THAT OF THE U.S. AND BRITAIN. RAMIREZ SAID THAT WAS HOW THEY SHOULD BE. HOWEVER, THE U.S. HAD TO LEARN ONE IMPORTANT THING; NO TO BE AFRAID OF CHANGE. THERE WOULD BE MANY MORE PROFOUND CHANGES IN LATIN AMERICA, AND THE U.S. COULD HAVE TO LEARN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MANAGU 00958 04 0F 04 2216237

TO ACCEPT THAT.

21. COMMENT: THE MEETING WAS NON-CONFRONTATIONAL. ASPIN.



CONFIDENTIAL

WORKING HIS WAY FROM POINT TO POINT, CONTROLLED
THE DIRECTION OF THE CONVERSATION AND BROUGHT RAMIREZ
BACK TO SPECIFICS WHEN HE STARTED TO WANDER. OF PARTICULAR
SIGNIFICANCE WERE RAMIREZ ATTEMPTS TO PORTRAY THE NICARAGUAN
ELECTORAL PROCESS AS TRADITIONALLY LATIN AMERICAN. HE
SAID IF THE SANDINISTAS WERE NOT ELECTED, THEY WOULD
ACCEPT THE DEFEAT AND SURRENDER POWER. THE GRN DOES NOT
EXPECT TO LOSE, AND SUCH STATEMENTS ARE SAFE
FOR RAMIREZ OR OTHERS TO MAKE. WHILE RAMIREZ CITED ECONOMIC
LOSSES OF \$250 MILLION. OUR BEST ESTIMATES SHOW ACTUAL
DIRECT LOSSES TO BE ABOUT ONE-TENTH OF THAT FIGURE.
RAMAIREZ STOOD FIRM ON THE GRN'S PROPOSAL TO DISCUSS MILITARY
ADVISERS AND SUPPORT TO THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS ONLY
IN CONJUNCTION WITH A REGIONAL AGREEMENT.
QUAINTON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL WEELSSIFED